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Abstract
We come back to the initial design of the ∇ quantiﬁer by Miller and Tiu, which we call minimal generic
quantiﬁcation. In the absence of ﬁxed points, it is equivalent to seemingly stronger designs. However,
several expected theorems about (co)inductive speciﬁcations can not be derived in that setting. We present
a reﬁnement of minimal generic quantiﬁcation that brings the expected expressivity while keeping the
minimal semantic, which we claim is useful to get natural adequate speciﬁcations. We build on the idea
that generic quantiﬁcation is not a logical connective but one that is deﬁned, like negation in classical logics.
This allows us to use the standard (co)induction rule, but obtain much more expressivity than before. We
show classes of theorems that can now be derived in the logic, and present a few practical examples.
Keywords: Proof theory, generic quantiﬁcation, ﬁxed points, higher-order abstract syntax.
1 Introduction
A logic is a system that can represent objects, but also provides means to analyze
them, reason about the relationships between these objects. Diﬀerent logics allow
more or less natural encodings of diﬀerent object systems. The notion of generic
quantiﬁcation has been introduced in proof theory in order to obtain logics in which
one can naturally specify systems involving variable bindings, such as programming
languages, type systems or logics. Before detailing more that aspect, let us re-
call how algebraic speciﬁcations can be logically supported, for three increasingly
demanding tasks: computing, model-checking and reasoning — from the proof-as-
programs viewpoint, representing objects, then ﬁnite and ﬁnally inﬁnite behaviour
functions on those objects.
The purpose of logical frameworks is to allow declarative and adequate repre-
sentations of various object systems. The classic example is that natural numbers
are in bijection with normal intuitionistic proofs of N ⊃ (N ⊃ N) ⊃ N . Prolog
built on that idea: the search for objects satisfying the speciﬁcation is reduced to
the search of some normal forms of proofs. Proof search in the framework provides
a mean to compute according to the speciﬁcation.
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A logic should also provide some means to reason about its judgments, and hence
about encoded objects. This is the role of elimination rules. The least is to support
case-analysis, which turns proof-search into model-checking, that is inspecting ﬁnite
behaviours. This is obtained by moving to the notion of ﬁxed points. In that setting,
nat is deﬁned as μ(λX.λn.n = 0 ∨ ∃p.n = (s p) ∧Xn), or simply μ(λX. ∨X) if
one regards proofs as programs. And the logic is equipped with the following case-
analysis and back-chaining rules:
Γ, B(μB)t  G
Γ, μBt  G
Γ  B(μB)t
Γ  μBt
One does not need more for analyzing ﬁnite behaviours. Using the left unfolding
rule, one can for example deduce that any natural number is either zero or a succes-
sor. It is interesting to notice that when hypothesis can be exhaustively analyzed
in a ﬁnite number of steps, the initial rule (also called axiom rule) becomes useless:
after the exhaustive case analysis, the goal can be built explictly from its ﬁxed point
deﬁnition. For example, the Bedwyr [2] system works under that assumption.
In order to reason about inﬁnite behaviours or inﬁnite collections of objects such
as natural numbers, the initial rule becomes necessary. This raises the question of
the identity of judgments, which is negligible in many cases but crucial for generic
judgments. More expressivity is often needed, coming with the distinction of two
dual kinds of ﬁxed points and their associated deduction principles: least ﬁxed
points are represented by inductive speciﬁcations μB and analyzed by induction;
greatest ﬁxed points are represented by coinductive speciﬁcations νB and are built
by coinduction. All this is well-established proof theory:
Γ, St  G BSx  Sx
Γ, μBt  G
Γ  St Sx  BSx
Γ  νBt
It is important to notice that the addition of more introspective abilities to the
logic did not make it miss the initial target, that is adequate representations. Proofs
of nat are still exactly natural numbers, and proofs of nat ⊃ nat can still be seen as
functions from natural numbers to natural numbers, computed via cut elimination.
We shall now contrast that with the incomplete picture corresponding to the state
of the art regarding the speciﬁcation of systems involving variable binding.
The higher-order abstract syntax approach [12,6] pioneered by Twelf [14] and
λProlog [9] provides an elegant way to represent systems involving variable bind-
ing, encoding the object-level binding by the notion of binding already present in
the logic. In the proof-as-program approach, one uses the abstraction of proofs
terms. In the λ-tree approach, term-level abstractions are used, e.g., encoding the
introduction of a generic variable by an universal quantiﬁcation:
∀f. (∀x. term x ⊃ term (fx)) ⊃ term (abs (λx. fx))
The α-conversion of the logic is then inherited by the represented system. Of course,
this technique only provides elegant encodings when the notions of scope and bind-
ing of the encoded system match those of the encoding logic.
However, the universal quantiﬁcation only acts as a generic quantiﬁcation when
it occurs positively. On the left hand-side of a sequent, its “for all” semantic makes
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a diﬀerence: instead of introducing a generic variable, it is expecting a term to
substitute for the variable. In spirit, generic quantiﬁcation should not require to
deal with terms inhabiting the types of generic variables. This mismatch required
new proof-theoretic designs in order to obtain a satisfying support of case analysis.
Several solutions [19,13,5] have been developped, revolving around an essential idea:
keeping the generic variables in a context local to the formula. We shall focus
on the earliest design, which is also the simplest incarnation of this idea: the ∇
quantiﬁer [10,11]. It extends sequents with generic contexts σ surrounding formulas,
denoted by σ Pσ — we write Pσ to indicate that the generic variables can occur
in the formula, also implicitly assuming that they don’t occur free in P anymore.
We call this early design “minimal generic quantiﬁcation” because of the absence of
any structural rule for generic contexts. Despite its minimality, it is fully satisfying
for reasoning about ﬁnite behaviours, where the identity of judgments does not
matter. Notably, Miller and Tiu have shown that this core support of generic
quantiﬁcation, combined with least and greatest ﬁxed points in the logic LINC [17],
is enough for providing a fully declarative speciﬁcation of ﬁnite π-calculus and its
bisimulation [18]. Again, the ability to adequately represent objects has not been
aﬀected, since ∇ and ∀ are identical when restricted to positive occurences. When
representing objects in the logic, we are actually only moving object-level binders
to the formula-level generic context, which keeps an exact track of the scope.
Things get signiﬁcantly more complicated with inﬁnite behaviours. In LINC, the
initial rule requires an exact match (modulo α-conversion) of the generic contexts:
σ  Pσ  σ  Pσ
Without any structural rule on the generic context, this often seems too restric-
tive. The design of the induction rule also turns out to be problematic. In the
end, the interplay of minimal generic quantiﬁcation and ﬁxed points in LINC
lacks in expressivity. Theorems which should intuitively hold are underivable, e.g.,
∀x. (∇y. nat x) ⊃ nat x. This has lead to the development of radically diﬀerent
notions of generic quantiﬁcation. It is typically made stronger, in order to always
have ∀x. Px ⊃ ∇x. Px and ∇x. Px ⊃ ∃x. Px, which implies P ≡ ∇x. P when
x does not occur free in P . In our opinion, this is not a satisfying solution: this
stronger semantic of generic quantiﬁcation does not match the needs of some speci-
ﬁcations. Consider for example the speciﬁcation of provability in some object logic.
The natural ﬁxed-point clause for universal quantiﬁcation is:
prove Γ (∀ˆ(λx. Px)) := ∇x. prove Γ (Px)
With minimal generic quantiﬁcation, the generic context exactly represents the sig-
nature of the object sequent. With a stronger generic quantiﬁcation this is no longer
true. Indeed, we could derive immediately that prove Γ (∀ˆ(λx. P )) ⊃ prove Γ P .
This is not wanted in all cases. In particular, in presence of a cut rule, one would
expect that a proof of such a statement provides a way to eliminate cuts for which
the cut-formula contains an occurence of the (seemingly) vacuous ∀ˆ. This inade-
quacy can be seen as analogous to the impossibility to represent directly a linear
logic in an intuitionistic framework.
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In this paper, we come back to the design of minimal generic quantiﬁcation.
In Section 2 we propose the logic μLJ∇ as an alternative that brings the expected
expressivity. The key is a better interaction of ﬁxed point constructions and generic
quantiﬁcaton, which is not treated as a logical connective anymore. Structural
rules on the generic context will still not be admitted in general, allowing adequate
representations of systems following a strict management of variables. In Section 3
we study the meta-theory of μLJ∇, notably exhibiting a large syntactic class of
formulas for which structural rules can in fact be derived. Finally, we illustrate how
the logic can be practically used on a few signiﬁcant examples in Section 4.
2 Deﬁnitions
We shall work on two logics: μLJ∇0 which incarnates the initial design of minimal
generic quantiﬁcation, and its corrected version μLJ∇ where ∇ is no more a logical
connective. In both systems, we are not going to consider atoms, that is predicate
constants. By essence, atoms have an undeﬁned behaviour, unlike ﬁxed points. If
one wants to obtain ∇x. p ⊃ p for an atom p, there is no other option than adding
it as a rule in the logic, whereas with a ﬁxed point the theorem could be obtained
by (co)induction. Not considering atoms is motivated practically, because users of
a logic usually work on deﬁned notions, but also theoretically, as we ﬁnd important
for the logician to study what can be derived from the simplest deﬁnition before
playing the game of choosing which axioms to force uniformly.
In the following, the type of formulas is o, and γ denotes a term type, that is any
simple type in which o does not occur. Terms are denoted by u, v, t; formulas by
P,Q, S; term variables by x, y, z; and predicate variables by p, q. We write vectors
as −→t , and sometimes (ti)i for readability. In all systems considered in this paper,
formulas are of the following forms:
P ::=P ∧ P | P ∨ P | P ⊃ P |  | ⊥
| ∃γx.Px | ∀γx.Px | ∇γx.Px | s γ= t | s
γ
= t | μγ1...γnB−→t | νγ1...γnB−→t
The quantiﬁers have type (γ → o) → o and the equality and inequality have type
γ → γ → o. The connectives μ and ν have type (τ → τ) → τ where τ is γ1 → · · · →
γn → o for some arity n ≥ 0. Formulas with top-level connective μ or ν are called
ﬁxed point expressions and can be arbitrarily nested. The ﬁrst argument of a ﬁxed
point expression, denoted by B, is called its body. For consistency, it is required to
be monotonic: negative occurences of the bound predicate variable are forbidden.
Figure 1 deﬁnes μLJ=, the basic system on top of which are built logics support-
ing generic quantiﬁcation. It consists in ﬁrst-order propositional intuitionistic logic
extended with ﬁxed points and equality. For background and details about deﬁni-
tions, ﬁxed points and the treatment of equality, we refer the reader to [16,7,17,2].
Generic contexts are lists of typed term variables, denoted by σ or ζ. If σ is
a generic context (x1 : γ1, . . . , xn : γn) we denote by σ → γ the type γ1 → . . . →
γn → γ, and call it γ lifted over σ. Analogously, we talk of lifted variables when
they have a lifted type. We also use a generic context as a list of terms, writing
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Propositional intuitionistic logic
Γ, P  P Γ,⊥  P Γ  
Γ, P, P ′  Q
Γ, P ∧ P ′  Q
Γ  P Γ  Q
Γ  P ∧Q
Γ, P  Q Γ, P ′  Q
Γ, P ∨ P ′  Q
Γ  P
Γ  P ∨ P ′
Γ  P ′
Γ  P ∨ P ′
Γ  P Γ, P ′  Q
Γ, P ⊃ P ′  Q
Γ, P  Q
Γ  P ⊃ Q
First-order structure
Γ, Ph  Q
Γ,∃x.Px  Q
Γ  Pt
Γ  ∃x.Px
Γ, P t  Q
Γ,∀x.Px  Q
Γ  Ph
Γ  ∀x.Px
{(Γ  Q)θ : tθ .= t′θ}
Γ, t = t′  Q Γ  t = t
Fixed points
Γ, St  P BSx  Sx
Γ, μBt  P
Γ  B(μB)t
Γ  μBt
Γ, B(νB)t  P
Γ, νBt  P
Γ  St Sx  BSx
Γ  νBt
Fig. 1. Inference rules for μLJ= and μLJ∇. The eigenvariable h does not occur free in the conclusion
sequent of ∀-R and ∃-L, and S is closed in μ-L and ν-R.
(Fσ) for ((Fx1) . . . xn). Similarly, f(xi)i stands for ((fx1) . . . xn).
Type annotations are omitted for conciseness most of the time, but can be
recovered from the context. In order to make type inference easier, we use the
convention of naming x′ a lifted version of x. Finally, we use the convention that
when we write (λa.t), the variable a does not occur free in t.
2.1 The logic μLJ∇0
The logic μLJ∇0 is essentially the same as LINC [17]. The only diﬀerence lies in the
use of ﬁxed points rather than deﬁnitions. This slight shift of point of view brings
more expressivity, but most importantly gives more ﬂexibility when working on the
logic.
The system is obtained from μLJ= by enriching the sequent structure, sur-
rounding each formula by a local generic context which binds generic variables in
the formula. A formula surrounded by its generic context forms a generic judgment,
denoted by G. Variables are introduced in the new context by generic quantiﬁcation:
Γ, (σ, x) Pσx  G
Γ, σ ∇x.Pσx  G
Γ  (σ, x) Pσx
Γ  σ ∇x.Pσx
Propositional deduction rules are adapted in an orthogonal fashion. Under the
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generic context, the reasoning takes place as before, for example:
σ  Pσ  σ  Pσ
Γ  σ  Pσ Γ, σ Qσ  G
Γ, σ  Pσ ⊃ Qσ  G
Γ, σ  Pσ  σ Qσ
Γ  σ  Pσ ⊃ Qσ
The ﬁrst-order rules interact with the generic context, causing a lifting of terms and
term variables. In the rules for universal quantiﬁcation, if x has type γ then t and
the eigenvariable h have type σ → γ:
Σ; Γ, σ  Pσ(tσ)  G
Σ;Γ, σ  ∀x.Pσx  G
Σ, h; Γ  σ  Pσ(hσ)
Σ; Γ  σ  ∀x.Pσx
{(Γ  G)θ : tθ .= t′θ}
Γ, σ  tσ = t′σ  G Γ  σ  tσ = tσ
At this point, we have described how the logic treats ﬁnite behaviour formulas,
those that do not involve ﬁxed points. In that setting, the deduction rules can be
read as equivalences, for example ∇x. Px ∧ Qx ≡ (∇x. Px) ∧ (∇x. Qx), which
allow to eliminate ∇ by pushing it down through logical connectives, eventually
disappearing, for example thanks to (∇x. ux = vx) ≡ u = v. A similar observation
is that any proof of a ﬁnite behaviour can be η-expanded until it does not use the
initial rule anymore, but where the only leafs are the rules for ,⊥ and equality.
Both observations imply that there is no need to ever compare two generic contexts,
and hence no need to consider structural rules for them. Note, however that the
dynamic aspect of the second one makes it stronger; for example it extends to ﬁxed
points, giving rise to the Bedwyr system.
The ﬁxed point rules are adapted as follows:
Γ, σ  S(tσ)  P BSx  Sx
Γ, σ  μB(tσ)  P
Γ  σ B(μB)(tσ)
Γ  σ  μB(tσ)
The extended unfolding rule states that liftings of a ﬁxed point unfold just like
the original version. The induction rule seems less natural, essentially stating that
liftings of the invariants of a ﬁxed point are invariants of its liftings. Tiu noticed [17]
that it was too weak, since it does not allow any modiﬁcation of the generic context
σ when inducting under it. As a consequence, it is impossible to prove things like
∀x. (∇a. nat x) ⊃ nat x. This seems unfortunate because nat, deﬁned as a ﬁxed
point, clearly does not rely on the generic context.
2.2 μLJ∇: treating ∇ as a non-logical connective
The self-duality of generic quantiﬁcation, as well as its ability to commute with
almost all connectives of μLJ∇0 , suggests that it might not be a logical connective
but rather a deﬁned one, like negation in classical logics. Indeed, we shall deﬁne a
formula transformation φ that transforms a formula into one where the∇ quantiﬁers
only occur above bound predicate variables inside ﬁxed point constructions. This
is in slight contrast with the classical negation which can be eliminated statically
even inside ﬁxed points, because of the monotonicity constraint. The important
point remains: since ∇ does not occur anymore at toplevel in a sequent, it loses its
logical role.
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The logic μLJ∇ has the same rules as μLJ=, cf. Figure 1. Unlike μLJ∇0 , it has
no extra sequent structure. The rules for ﬁxed points are written the same way, but
the implicit elimination of toplevel ∇ quantiﬁers which might occur in BS will play
a critical role.
Γ, St  P BSx  Sx
Γ, μBt  P
Γ  B(μB)t
Γ  μBt
We deﬁne the connective ∇ by identifying a formula F at toplevel in a se-
quent with φ(F ) where ∇ does not occur anymore except inside ﬁxed point bodies.
The transformation is parametrized by two contexts initially empty, and written
φΓσ(P |Γ|σ). Here, σ is a generic context, i.e., a list of term variables. The context Γ
contains associations of the form 〈p, σ, p′〉 where p is a predicate variable of type γ,
σ = x1 : γ1, . . . , xn : γn is a generic context and p′ is an other predicate variable of
type γ1 → . . . → γn → γ. The support of Γ, written |Γ|, is the variables p. As indi-
cated by the notation in P |Γ|σ, the predicate variables of |Γ| and the term variables
of σ may occur in the original formula. These occurences are bound by the two
contexts. In the transformed formula only the p′ will be found. Finally, the order
does not matter in Γ unlike in σ. The inductive deﬁnition of the transformation is
given on Figure 2.
That full deﬁnition can be reduced to the deﬁnition of the behaviour of φ on
term and predicate abstractions and variables, extended in an orthogonal way to the
full language of formulas. For doing so, one should carefully separate the binding
and logical aspects of ∀,∃, μ and ν. Along these lines, we shall write φ applied not
only to formulas but also to formulas abstracted over terms such as in φσ(μB), or
formulas and terms such as in μφσ(B).
φΓσ(∇x. P |Γ|σx) ≡ φΓσ,x(P |Γ|σx)
φΓσ(∀x. P |Γ|σx) ≡ ∀x′. φΓσ(P |Γ|σ(x′σ)) φΓσ(∃x. P |Γ|σx) ≡ ∃x′. φΓσ(P |Γ|σ(x′σ))
φΓσ(μ(λpλ−→x . B|Γ|pσ−→x )
−−→
(tσ)) ≡ μ(λp′λ−→y . φΓ,〈p,σ,p′〉σ (B|Γ|pσ
−−→
(yσ)))−→t
φΓσ(ν(λpλ−→x . B|Γ|pσ−→x )
−−→
(tσ)) ≡ ν(λp′λ−→y . φΓ,〈p,σ,p′〉σ (B|Γ|pσ
−−→
(yσ)))−→t
φΓσ(a(tσ)) ≡ ∇σ. a(tσ) φΓ,〈p,σ,p
′〉
σσ′ (p(tσσ
′)) ≡ ∇σ′. p′(λσ. tσσ′)
φΓσ(uσ = vσ) ≡ u = v φΓσ() ≡  φΓσ() ≡ 
φΓσ(P |Γ|σ ∧Q|Γ|σ) ≡ φΓσ(P |Γ|σ) ∧ φΓσ(Q|Γ|σ)
φΓσ(P |Γ|σ ∨Q|Γ|σ) ≡ φΓσ(P |Γ|σ) ∨ φΓσ(Q|Γ|σ)
φΓσ(P |Γ|σ ⊃ Q|Γ|σ) ≡ φΓσ(P |Γ|σ) ⊃ φΓσ(Q|Γ|σ)
Fig. 2. The transformation φ deﬁning ∇
Example 2.1 The elimination of ∇ on ﬁnite-behaviour formulas described for
μLJ∇0 in Section 2.1 is now an identity. In μLJ∇ the two following formulas are
identiﬁed:
∇x.∀y.∇z.y = z ⊃ ⊥ ≡ ∀y′.(λxz.y′x) = (λxz.z) ⊃ ⊥
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Example 2.2 We deﬁne the well-formedness of terms in a purely abstractive lan-
guage, assuming constants nil :: lst, cons :: α → lst → lst and abs :: (α → tm) →
tm, as follows:
mem
def
= μ(λMλxλΓ. ∃hd∃tl. Γ = (cons hd tl) ∧ (x = hd ∨M x tl))
term
def
= μ(λTλΓλt. mem t Γ ∨ ∃f. t = abs f ∧∇αx. T (cons x Γ) (f x))
It does not look very diﬀerent from μLJ∇0 . But the ∇ inside the body of the
ﬁxed point term should be read as a suspensed lifting, waiting for the instantiation
of T . In a sense, the ﬁxed point does not only deﬁne a predicate, but rather a family
of liftings. Let us now consider the lifting of the deﬁnitions of mem and term. For
readability we lift over an other type than α:
φ(y:β)(mem)
def
=
μ(λM ′λx′λΓ′. ∃hd′∃tl′. Γ′ = (λβy. cons (hd′ y) (tl′ y)) ∧ (x′ = hd′ ∨M ′ x′ tl′))
φ(y:β)(term)
def
= μ(λT ′λΓ′λt′. φ(y:β)(mem) t′ Γ′ ∨
∃f ′. t′ = (λβy.abs (f ′y)) ∧∇x. T ′ (λβy. cons x (Γ′y)) (λβy. f ′yx))
In other words, the induction on φ(y:β)(term) corresponds to the following principle,
where S is the tentative invariant:
(∀Γ′∀x′. φ(y:β)(mem) x′ Γ′ ⊃ S Γ′ x′)
⊃ (∀Γ′∀f ′. φ(x:α)(S) (λxλy. cons x (Γ′y)) (λxλy. f ′yx) ⊃ S Γ′ (λy. abs (f ′y)))
⊃ (∀Γ′∀t′. φ(y:β)(term) Γ′ t′ ⊃ S Γ′ t′)
For example it can be used with the invariant:
S := λΓ′λx′.∀Γ∀x. (Γ′ = (λy.Γ) ∧ x′ = (λy.x)) ⊃ term Γ x
After a similar sub-induction on φ(y:β)(mem) one will have obtained a derivation
of:
∀Γ∀x. (∇y. term Γ x) ⊃ term Γ x
3 The theory of μLJ∇
The lifting transformation behaves nicely with respect to ﬁrst-order abstraction,
i.e., φσ(Fσ(tσ)) ≡ ((λx′. φσ(Fσ(x′σ)))t). Unfortunately, the same does not hold
for second-order abstraction: φσ(B)φσ(S) is not necessarily the same as φσ(BS).
Consider an abstraction B := (λp . . .∇σ′(. . . p . . .)). In φσ(BS) the occurence of p
will become φσσ′(S) whereas in φσ(B)φσ(S) it becomes φσ′(φσ(S)).
This is technically complicating the metatheory, but our attempts to change
the deﬁnition and avoid that have been unsuccessful. In fact, this permutation of
names can be understood as inherent to the identifaction of ∇σ. μB and μφσ(B).
Indeed, these two ﬁxed points reveal two diﬀerent preﬁxes of generic quantiﬁers
after n unfoldings, respectively σ(σ′)n and (σ′)nσ.
D. Baelde / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 228 (2009) 3–1910
We shall establish, however, that the permutation of names does not aﬀect
provability. This can be derived in the logic itself, not only at the meta level. It will
provide a way to bridge the gap between φσ(BS) and φσ(B)φσ(S) by translating
all permuted instances.
Proposition 3.1 For any formula P , and any two generic contexts σ and σ∗ per-
mutations of each other, it is provable that (∇σ. Pσ) ⊃ (∇σ∗. Pσ).
The proof basically builds a corrected η-expansion, carrying the permutability
from elementary formulas (equality,  and ⊥) through all connectives including μ
and ν. In a sense, there is nothing clever in it: at any point there is only one choice
that keeps things well-typed. That said, it is a good test for the logic to check that
everything goes as expected. The details of this proof, as for other propositions of
this section, can be found in [1].
Corollary 3.2 Proposition 3.1 actually provides a mean to transform a deriva-
tion into another one establishing the same sequent where some instances of φσ(F )
have been replaced by some permutation φσ∗(F ): this is done by cutting against
η-expansions of the derivations provided by the proposition. In particular, it allows
to compensate the diﬀerence between φσ(B)φσ(S) and φσ(BS).
Deﬁnition 3.3 We extend the notion of lifting to sequents:
φσ(x1, . . . , xn;P1(xi)i, . . . , Pm(xi)i  Q(xi)i) :=
x′1, . . . , x′n;φσ(P1(x′iσ)i), . . . , φσ(Pm(x
′
iσ)i)  φσ(Q(x′iσ)i)
Proposition 3.4 (Lifting derivations) For any σ, the provability of Σ;Γ  P
implies that of φσ(Σ; Γ  P ) 1 .
This allows one to read a proof of (∀t. (∇a. p t) ⊃ p t) as not only establishing
that the provability of p in the context of one unused generic variable entails that
of p in the empty context, but more generally that the provability is stable by
removal of an unused variable from any context. This is what makes our system
expressive without any need for concrete manipulations of the context and other
complex devices such as quantiﬁcations over all generic contexts.
Proposition 3.5 (Conservativity & expressivity) We call 0-provability the
provability without any use of the (co)induction rules. Let P be a formula, pos-
sibly involving ∇ quantiﬁcations.
(i) The 0-provability of P in μLJ∇0 is equivalent to its 0-provability in μLJ∇.
(ii) Moreover, the provability of P in μLJ∇0 implies its provability in μLJ∇,
(iii) but the converse is false.
Proof. Each direction of (i) is done by induction on the 0-derivation. Both are
straightforward proof transformation similar to those detailed before, including cor-
rective cuts (cf. Corollary 3.2) as in Proposition 3.4. For (ii) we add the translation
1 We do not follow the notational conventions here: of course, the variables of Σ can occur in Γ and P ,
unlike those of σ.
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of an induction in μLJ∇0 to μLJ∇, which amounts to lift the invariant and the
invariance proof. Finally, (iii) shall be seen later, with the ability to weaken the
generic context in some cases in μLJ∇, which is impossible in μLJ∇0 . 
3.1 Cut-elimination
We adapt the proof reductions involved in cut-elimination, and argue that the ter-
mination is not aﬀected, leaving a detailed proof of that for future work. The only
novelty is the transformation φ. It only aﬀects second-order instantiations in ﬁxed
point unfoldings, induction and coinduction. It does not aﬀect several important
properties of the system: proofs can be instantiated, the signature can be enriched,
etc. The non-trivial part is adapting the reduction for eliminating a cut on a ﬁxed
point. We only show the case of the least ﬁxed point, the greatest being similar.
The essential reduction for least ﬁxed point is the following:
ΠS
BS−→x  S−→x
Π′
Γ, S−→t  P
Γ, μB−→t  P
Π
Γ  μB−→t
Γ  P −→
Π′
Γ, S−→t  P
fold(Π,ΠS)
Γ  S−→t
Γ  P
Where the fold(Π,ΠS) transformation replaces in Π all unfoldings of μB by a
cut against ΠS . More precisely, since the unfoldings might be lifted, occurences of
φσ(μB) = μ(φσ(B)) are replaced by φσ(S):
...
Γ  φσ(B)(μ(φσ(B)))−→t
Γ  μ(φσ(B))−→t
μR −→
...
φσ(B)φσ(S)
−→
t  φσ(S)−→t Γ  φσ(B)φσ(S)−→t
Γ  φσ(S)−→t
cut
To complete this, one must build from ΠS , for a given σ and
−→
t , a proof of
φσ(B)φσ(S)
−→
t  φσ(S)−→t . Using Proposition 3.4 on ΠS we get a derivation of
φσ(BS−→x )  φσ(S−→x ). Then, Corallary 3.2 gives a proof of φσ(B)φσ(S)−→x  φσ(S)−→x
where −→x can ﬁnally be instantiated by −→t .
We leave the termination of the reduction for further work. Strictly speaking,
cut-elimination has not been established even for μLJ∇0 , which does not have the
stratiﬁcation constraints on which is built the proof for LINC [17]. However, based
on earlier work on μMALL= [3], we believe that it holds under the simple constraint
of monotonicity. But even with the stratiﬁcation constraint on ﬁxed points, the
termination of cut-elimination for LINC does not carry easily to μLJ∇, because of
the extra cuts inserted in the above reduction for translating between φ(BS) and
φ(B)φ(S).
3.2 Structural rules on the generic context
Minimal generic quantiﬁcation in μLJ∇0 did not assume an inﬁnity of undistin-
guishable generic variables, hence the absence of an immediate way of obtaining
strengthening or exchange on generic contexts. This has not been changed with
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μLJ∇. For example, (∇γx. ) ⊃ (∃γx. ) still can not be derived without as-
suming the non-vacuity of γ, which would make even (∃γx. ) alone derivable.
Symmetrically, ∀ does not imply ∇ in general. And vacuous generic quantiﬁcations
can not a priori be added or removed.
We show, however, that the missing generic strengthening and weakening are
actually derivable for a reasonable class of formulas. On such formulas, the mini-
mality does not make generic quantiﬁcation weaker than other approaches, just as
in the ﬁnite behaviour case. The essential idea for obtaining generic strengthening,
that is (∇x. P ) ⊃ P , is to forbid positive occurences of existential quantiﬁcation,
unless they are guarded by a formula that ensures that the existential variable does
not depend on the extra generic variable x.
Deﬁnition 3.6 A guard is a formula G such that for any σ:
∀y′. φxσ(Gσ(y′xσ)) ⊃ ∃y. y′ = (λx. y) ∧ φσ(Gσ(yσ))
A typical guard would be an equality (λσλy. uσy = vσy) such that all uniﬁers
of (λxσ. uσ(y′xσ) = vσ(y′xσ)) set y′ := λxλσ.yσ for some y. This holds for
the equalities found in most ﬁxed point deﬁnitions, which fully deﬁne the newly
introduced existential variable as a compound or a sub-term of the pre-existing
terms.
Deﬁnition 3.7 The fragments W and S (respectively standing for Weakening and
Strengthening) are mutually deﬁned by the following grammar, where G denotes a
guard:
W ::= W ∧W | W ∨W |  | ⊥ | u = v | ∇x.W | μW | νW
| S ⊃ W | ∃x. W | ∀x. Gx ⊃ W
S ::= S ∧ S | S ∨ S |  | ⊥ | u = v | ∇x.S | μS | νS
| W ⊃ S | ∀x. S | ∃x. Gx ∧ S
Proposition 3.8 For any formula W ∈ W (resp. S ∈ S) it is provable that W ⊃
∇x. W (resp. ∇x. S ⊃ S).
An other way to put it, for example, is that the following rules are admissible
in μLJ∇:
Γ, σ, σ′  Sσσ′  G
Γ, σ, x, σ′  Sσσ′  G
Γ  σ, σ′ Wσσ′
Γ  σ, x, σ′ Wσσ′
Proposition 3.8 is very useful in pratice. Indeed, most common ﬁxed points (nat,
mem, append, term, typeof . . . ) are both in S and W: they do not involve any
universal quantiﬁcation and the existential quantiﬁcations are guarded by equalities.
Most of the time, the existentials are actually very weak in that they do not even
require any invention, such as in ∃y. x = s y ∧ . . ..
Example 3.9 Coming back to the introductory discussion about adequacy, the
typical example of a ﬁxed point that does not fall in S is provability in an object
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logic with a cut rule. Indeed, the cut rule involves an existential quantiﬁcation
that is not guarded at all, and can notably range over variables present in the
object-level signature (that is the generic context) even though not anywhere else
in the object sequent (that is the parameters of our ﬁxed point). Thus, deriving
prove Γ (∀ˆ(λx. P )) ⊃ prove Γ P necessarily involves the description of at least a
limited form of cut-elimination that removes the cut-formulas involving the allegedly
useless generic variable x. It seems reasonable that such a non-trivial property of
the encoded logic is not given for free by the logical framework but has to be worked
out the user.
Another example of guard would be nat itself, as it forces its parameter to be
fully deﬁned in terms of the constants zero and successor. We let the reader check
that the following can be derived in μLJ∇: (∇x. nat(y′x) ⊃ ∃y. y′ = (λx.y)∧nat y.
More interestingly, it should be possible to characterize a fragment of valid guards,
which could build on top of guards like our W and S did, such that from a basic
guard (e.g., λy. x = s y) one could derive an other (e.g., nat), and an other (e.g.,
natlist), etc.
4 Practical use of μLJ∇
We describe here a few signiﬁcant examples of what can be done with μLJ∇. These
examples have been checked 2 using the interactive theorem prover Taci [15], an
unreleased tool from the Slimmer project. Taci is a simple generic tactic-based
interactive theorem prover, in which a logician can plug his own logic as an OCaml
module. Starting with the initial speciﬁcation of μLJ=, we added support for the
transformation φ, obtaining a convenient implementation of μLJ∇. Formulas are
not always manipulated in φ-normal form, but generic variables can occur in an
explicit generic context. The elimination of toplevel generic quantiﬁcations and
contexts is triggered by the tactic abstract, usually before applying the induction
rule.
It currently provides little automation, incarnated by the tactic prove which
performs a focused proof-search. It treats ﬁxed points as described in [3] but is
still not able to infer invariants, and is thus limited to unfoldings. Ongoing work
in that direction promises much more automation in these simple developments.
In particular, instances of all properties proved in this paper would actually be
established automatically by simple heuristics: in our proofs, when we build a
derivation using the induction rule, the invariant can be infered from the conclusion.
Bureaucratic lemmas such as strengthening of generic quantiﬁcation, but also more
subtle things, detailed in the next example, would not be a burden for the user
anymore: the cost of having a minimal generic quantiﬁcation would vanish.
2 However, the code shown in this section is often not valid for Taci, but has been simpliﬁed for readability.
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4.1 The copy program
In that example we shall work on a representation of untyped λ-terms. We assume
a signature with a type tm and two constants: app of type tm → tm → tm and abs
of type (tm → tm) → tm. Notice that since these are term-level constants and not
ﬁxed point deﬁnitions, there is nothing wrong with negative occurence of tm in the
type of abs. The copy program is deﬁned as follows in λProlog:
copy (app M N) (app P Q) := copy M P, copy N Q.
copy (abs M) (abs P) :=
pi x\ pi y\ copy x y -> copy (M x) (N y).
It can be used for example to substitute a term into another: copy A B -> copy
M N requires that N is M where some (but not necessarily all) occurences of A are
changed into B.
There are mainly two approaches for encoding such a program in our logic. The
ﬁrst one is essentially the two-level approach [8] taken for example in the Abella
system [4]. It consists in specifying λProlog proof-search as an object logic, and
reasoning about its behaviour on the copy program. Given the initial formulation
of the problem, this is best from an adequacy point of view, but it is heavy and
notably does not allow direct inductions on the structure of copy. Instead, we
encode the program directly. We argue that this preserves most essential points,
and is adequate.
The encoding of the universal quantiﬁcation in the abstraction clause is a ∇
quantiﬁcation, reﬂecting the introduction of a generic variable. In order to encode
in a monotonic way the implication in that abs clause, we introduce a context
parameter representing the copy atoms present in the λProlog context. In the
encoding, a new clause appears, stating that if copy M N is found in the context,
then it holds.
copy := μ copy. λΓMN.
〈M,N〉 ∈ Γ
∨ (∃M1M2N1N2. M = (app M1 M2) ∧N = (app N1 N2) ∧
copy Γ M1 N1 ∧ copy Γ M2 N2)
∨ (∃M1N1. M = (abs M1) ∧N = (abs N1) ∧
∇xy. copy (〈x, y〉 :: Γ) (M1x) (N1y))
We shall prove an useful fact about that inductive deﬁnition:
∀MN. copy [] M N ⊃ M = N
This property should be proved by induction over copy. A naive invariant would
be that the context contains only pairs (m,m). It does not hold: when going under
an abstraction, two generic variables are introduced, marked equal in the context
Γ. Since they are generic, it does not break the result, but does make the invariant
more complex.
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In fact, we proceed by proving that copy implies eq, where eq is deﬁned as a
least ﬁxed point mostly like copy except for its abstraction clause:
eq (abs M) (abs N) := ∇x. eq (〈x, x〉 :: Γ) (M x) (N x)
For eq, it is now easy to show that if the context contains only pairs (m,m), it will
remain true and hence eq implies equality. It remains to show that copy implies eq,
which actually holds for any Γ. This is done by induction over copy, the interesting
case being that of abstraction:
∀ΓMN. (∇ab. eq ((a, b) :: Γ) (M a) (N b))
⊃ (∇a . eq ((a, a) :: Γ) (M a) (N a))
This goal really expresses the heart of our problem with the shape of the context.
It requires an induction under two generic quantiﬁcations. Basically, the invariant
should state that two generic variables can be merged. After having lifted eq over
the generic quantiﬁcations on a and b, this can actually be written elegantly as a
simple invariant, and the proof of invariance is straightforward:
λΓ′′M ′′N ′′. ∇a. eq (Γ′′ a a) (M ′′ a a) (N ′′ a a)
We do not know of any other system where it is possible to obtain the name
merging principle from the induction rule in such a direct way. The proofs cited
above can however be carried out in other logics, for example in LG [19] as pointed
out by Gacek, thanks to the strengthening on names. Since strengthening and
exchange are also admissible in μLJ∇ for copy and eq, that gives alternate, less
direct proofs in our system.
4.2 λ-calculus
We now discuss the speciﬁcation of simply typed λ-calculus a` la Church, and the
proofs of subject reduction and determinacy of typing. The signature for terms
will consist of two types: ty for simple types and tm for λ-terms; two constants for
terms: app :: tm → tm → tm and lambda :: ty → (tm → tm) → tm; the constant
arrow :: ty → ty → ty for types, as well as some arbitrary base types.
We shall not detail the deﬁnition of a predicate bind such that when Γ is a list of
pairs representing bindings, bind Γ k v expresses that 〈k, v〉 ∈ Γ. We deﬁne a least
ﬁxed point typeof such that the typing judgement (Γ Λ→ m : t) is represented by
(typeof Γ m t):
inductive typeof G M T :=
(bind G M T) ;
(sigma t\m1\m2\
M = (app m1 m2), typeof G m1 (arrow t T), typeof G m2 a) ;
(sigma t\t’\f\
M = lambda t f, T = arrow t t’,
nabla x\ typeof (cons (pair x t) G) (f x) t’).
Along these lines, we also specify one-step β-reduction as a least ﬁxed point
called one, and prove subject reduction as well as determinacy of typing. However,
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the statement of the theorems required particular care. In this style of speciﬁcation,
a variable is nothing but a placeholder for a term. Note for example that in the
typing relation, nothing forbids the typing context Γ to contain constructed terms,
instead of only variables as usual. This seems interesting, but certainly diﬀers from
the informal practice. One can try to stick to the usual notion of context; for
example we established subject reduction under the assumption that the context
does not contain constructed terms:
theorem subject_reduction :
pi m\n\ one m n =>
pi G\
(pi t\a\t’\ bind G (lambda t a) t’ => false) =>
(pi a\b\t’\ bind G (app a b) t’ => false) =>
pi t\ typeof G m t => typeof G n t.
For typed determinacy, we used an alternative deﬁnition of the notion of context.
Instead of assuming that keys are unique and not constructed, we assumed that
each binding satisﬁed type determinacy:
context G := pi x\t\ bind G x t => pi t’\ typeof G x t’ => t=t’.
theorem type_determinacy :
pi g\x\t\ typeof g x t => context g => pi t’\ typeof g x t’ => t=t’.
This formulation implies new branches compared to the usual proof. However they
are trivially treated, and overall the proof is not more complex than with more
traditional notions of contexts. Moreover, the resulting theorem is also slightly
stronger than the usual one, as it allows richer contexts.
We also explored a named style of speciﬁcation, which involves the addition of
a type n for free variables and a constructor var :: n → tm. The typing relation
can then be written as follows:
inductive typeof G M T :=
(sigma v\ M = var v, bind G v T) ;
(sigma t\m1\m2\
M = app m1 m2, typeof G m1 (arrow t T), typeof G m2 t) ;
(sigma t\t’\f\
M = lambda t f, T = arrow t t’,
nabla x\ typeof (cons (pair x t) G) (f (var x)) t’).
With that speciﬁcation, typing contexts now contain only variables, which are
objects of a diﬀerent kind than terms. This lead to a signiﬁcantly shorter proof of
type determinacy, requiring less bureaucracy.
With both styles of speciﬁcation, the μLJ∇ proof of subject reduction could
not be completly built within Taci, because our tool currently only strictly sup-
ports higher-order patterns. With the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, only a small gap was left
because of that. However, the named style of speciﬁcation was very inconvenient
to work with, producing much more uniﬁcations outside of the fragment, for ex-
ample (x\var x) = (x\m (var x)). In any case, this is only a problem of the
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implementation, not of the logic.
5 Conclusion
Thanks to a reformulation of the ∇ quantiﬁer as a deﬁned connective, we have re-
vealed the expressivity of minimal generic quantiﬁcation in presence of ﬁxed points.
This resulted in the logic μLJ∇, which is a good candidate for adequately repre-
senting objects, and reasoning in an expressive way about them.
We have notably exhibited classes of formulas for which generic weakening and
strengthening could be derived. It should be possible to build other classes cor-
responding to other common logical principles, such as (∇x. Px) ⊃ (∀x. Px), or
maybe even more exotic ones like (∇xy. Pxy) ⊃ (∇x. Pxx). More importantly,
these results should be integrated in mechanized theorem provers to simplify their
use. In fact, we claim that simple inductive theorem proving heuristics should be
able to achieve this goal, since the derivations do not involve clever invariants. Re-
garding automated theorem proving, an other strength of μLJ∇ is that its rules are
standard ones, the only novelty being in the quotienting of the formulas modulo
the lifting φ. Thus, results and heuristics for μLJ= should immediately extend to
μLJ∇.
From a theoretical point of view, we expect that the essential ideas behind the
design of μLJ∇ could be put to work in other settings if needed. For example,
adding structural rules to μLJ∇0 , i.e., working in LG, brings enough expressivity
for many non-trivial examples, but it is still unknown if that approach is strictly
more expressive. It might not be, as some trivial theorems of μLJ∇ do not seem to
be provable in LG, such as ∀lx′. (∇n. mem (x′ n) l) ⊃ ∃x. x′ = (λn. x).
Our system seems closely related in spirit to [13] which also manages contexts
in a strict way. But it is diﬃcult to clearly relate the two approaches, since ours is
based on ﬁrst-order logic while Pientka’s is purely computational but higher-order.
Extending our system to higher-order logic would be challenging but interesting, and
should allow for a better comparison with systems based on the proof-as-program
viewpoint.
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